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WRONGFUL CONVICTION, LAWYER
INCOMPETENCE AND ENGLISH LAW - SOME
RECENT THEMES
Geoffrey Bennett*
I. THE CONTEMPORARY BACKGROUND
Viewed from a distance the outward appearances of the English Legal
System might look reassuringly stable. In fact, nothing could be further from
the case. During the last ten years almost every facet of the system, even the
constitutional order, has been radically overhauled, or at least significantly
modified. The whole system of civil procedure has been recast, after over a
hundred years of relatively little major modification, in an attempt to simplify
and expedite proceedings with a new emphasis on judicial case management.I
Accepting a case on the basis of a contingency fee, once a reason for being
professionally disciplined, has in the last four years become lawful and routine
in certain types of cases. After some seven hundred years the powers of the
House of Lords have been significant curtailed.2 Perhaps most important of all,
the Human Rights Act 1998, which has been effective from October 2, 2000,
requires courts to take account of the European Convention on Human Rights
in reaching their decisions.3 It would be hard to overstate the importance of this
all-pervasive measure. Although it had long been the object of criticism, the
Act has almost certainly been a factor in the government's decision to abolish
the office of Lord Chancellor, after some 1,400 years of existence, which is
likely to require a major overhaul of many aspects of the legal system including,
for example, the appointment of judges.4 The 1998 Act predictably has had,
Notre Dame University, Director London Law Program.
'.Civil Procedure Act, 1997, c. 12 (Eng.); Civil Procedure Rules 1998. The legislation
followed a report by Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report. A convenient summary can
be found in LAW SociETY's GAzETrE, Aug. 2 1996. The recommendations for more judicial
intervention were influenced by perceptions of American practice.
2 Hereditary Peers are no longer entitled to vote in the House of Lords, House of Lords Act
1999, c. 34, and there are proposals for an elected chamber. A recent and helpful account of
developments can be found in DAWN OLIVER, CoNsTImUoNAL REFORM IN THE UK (2003).
3 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 12 (Eng.).
4 The unexpected timing of the announcement, which had involved little prior consultation,
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and continues to have, a major impact in the area of criminal procedure. One
recent example is the decision of the House of Lords to strip the Home
Secretary of his power to set the tariff for those sentenced to life imprisonment.5
This, in turn, seems to have increased tension between the legislature and the
judiciary on the whole issue of sentencing.6 Most recently, the Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002 extends the draconian confiscation provisions which were
already in place for drug related offences to offences generally.7  This
legislation introduces the entirely new concept of a 'criminal lifestyle' as part of
the basis for confiscation and is almost certainly likely to be challenged under
the Human Rights Act 1998. The climate is therefore one of pervasive change
in many areas of law,8 and this includes criminal procedure to a very
significant degree.9
Against this background of change it is striking that the movement towards
codification of the criminal law, substantive and procedural, has made no
ground at all, and shows no sign of doing so. A basic reform which ought to
reduce the risk of lawyer incompetence, amongst other things, is to ensure that
out and will be the subject of further discussion. In the meantime, a new Lord Chancellor has
been appointed to oversee the dismantling of the office. A large number of statutory provisions,
reflecting the wide-ranging powers and responsibilities of the post, will need to be amended or
recast to accommodate the new constitutional arrangements, whatever they turn out to be. See
Richard Comes, The UK Supreme Court, NEW L.J., July 4,2002, at 1018-1019 (discussing the
proposals for a new Supreme Court and reforming the appointment process for judges).
5 See R. (on the application of Anderson) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2002] 3
W.L.R. 1800 (H.L.).
6 The consequences may be new legislation to restrict the discretion of judges, as is
common in American jurisdictions. Lord Woolf, the current Lord Chief Justice, took the unusual
step of publicly criticising this proposal in a debate in the House of Lords. He commented that
sentencing, particularly in relation to murder, "should be removed from the political arena."
"The present proposal will have the effect of increasing political involvement." Francis Gibb &
Greg Hurst, Woolf Attacks Political Interference in Courts, THE TIMES OF LONDON, June 17
2003, at 2.
7 Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, c. 29 Part 2 (Eng.).
8 The Lord Chancellor is even considering abandoning the wearing of wigs in court. See
Francis Gibb, Legal Bigwigs in Line for a Modern Makeover, THE TIMES OF LONDON, May 9,
2003. It seems possible that they may be retained for criminal proceedings in the Crown Court.
See id.
9 In two significant areas there is currently consideration of borrowing from the American
Legal Sytem. See News, NEW L.J., June 20, 2003. The Home Secretary has announced
proposals to introduce public prosecutors as a way to ensure that the criminal justice system
serves its local community. See id. David Blunkett stated that such prosecutors would
"command the sort of standing they do in the US." Id. at 935. There is also a limited pilot
scheme for public defenders, but this is not expected to lead to a report on the operation of the
scheme until 2004.
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the rules are at least as transparent and accessible as they can be made. Despite
the fact that the Law Commission produced a draft criminal law code as far
back as 1985 there seems no immediate likelihood that it will be
implemented.' 0 Perhaps even more surprising, there is not even a draft code of
evidence despite the difficulty of applying principles spread out amongst a
bewildering array of common law rules and statutes, many of which go back to
the nineteenth century. Such reform as has been carried out has been entirely
piecemeal and there is nothing to compare with the Uniform or Federal Rules
of Evidence."' It will come as no surprise that there does not appear to be any
interest, outside academic circles, for a codification of criminal procedure. As
one commentator has observed, not only would there be significant advantages
to codification, it would also be eminently feasible.' 2 Amongst the reasons for
reform are the fragmented state of the rules of criminal procedure, the difficulty
this poses for anyone trying to discover what the rules are, and the
contradictions which flow from the haphazard way different sets of rules are
created, usually as a piecemeal response to a particular problem. 3 That
10 Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law: a report to the Law Commission,
Law Corn No. 143 (1985). There are numerous articles advocating its implementation. See,
e.g., Glazebrook, Still No Code! English Criminal Law 1894-1994, in CrrY UNIVERSITY
CENTENARY LECTURES IN LAW 1 (1996); Lord Bingham of Cornhill, A Criminal Code: Must We
Wait for Ever?, [1998] CRIM. L.R. 694 (1998) (At the time of publishing this article Lord
Bingham was the Lord Chief Justice of England, effectively the senior criminal judge. He is
currently the senior judge in the House of Lords).
1 "See, e.g., Evidence And Ossification, in CITY UNIVERSrrY CENTENARY LECTURES IN LAW
47 (1996). The problem is perhaps more acute in the criminal field where the law of evidence
tends to be more strictly applied. In R v Kearley, [1992] 2 W.L.R. 656 (H.L.), the House of
Lords rejected as hearsay the evidence of 17 callers to a suspected drug dealer seeking to place
orders for drugs. Lord Griffiths thought "as a matter of common sense it is difficult to think of
much more convincing evidence of his activity as a drug dealer than customers constantly
ringing his flat to buy drugs and a stream of customers beating a path to his door for the same
purpose." Id. at 659. He went on to say: "I believe that most laymen if told that the criminal
law of evidence forbade them even to consider such evidence as we are debating in this appeal
would reply, 'then the Law is an ass.' " Id.
A different result would presumably have been reached under Federal Law. See Zenni v
United States, 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980).
12 See J.R. Spencer, The Case for a Code of Criminal Procedure, [2000] CRIM L.R. 519.
13 As Professor Spencer comments:
Because we never made the effort to set out all the rules of criminal
procedure coherently between one set of covers, we never really see
the system in the round. In consequence of this we never fully
understand it, or appreciate what is happening to it - and the changes
that we make are generally reactive ones, and sometimes ill thought
out.
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something better could be achieved might be indicated by the way criminal
procedure was rationalised in Scotland over twenty-five years ago by the
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975.14 In 1995, a further Act consolidated
subsequent legislation and still managed to be shorter than its predecessor. 5 If
codification has proved to be so uncontroversially feasible in Scotland, is there
any compelling reason why England could not achieve as much?
Against this general background issues of incompetent representation and
miscarriage ofjustice have posed a number of different problems recently and
elicited at least one major reform of the procedural structure, the institution of a
Criminal Cases Review Commission.
16
II. INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL
Some of the most egregious cases in recent times of a defendant being
effectively deprived of legal representation have reached English courts on
appeal from former colonies. For example, in Dunkley v. Regina, in the midst
of a trial involving armed robbery and murder, counsel for the defendant
indicated that he wished to withdraw from the case. 17 The judge said he could
do as he pleased and told the defendant, "you are on your own. You will have
to defend yourself," and continued the trial without even an adjournment.' 8
The defendant was ultimately found guilty of what was a capital offence and his
appeal eventually reached the Privy Council in London as, at that date, the final
court of appeal from Jamaica.' 9 It is perhaps not entirely surprising that the
defendant's appeal was allowed. Where a defendant on a capital charge was
left unrepresented through no fault of his own there should, it was said,
normally be an adjournment to enable him to try and secure alternative
representation. Even before that stage, a trial judge should seek to persuade
counsel to remain or consider adjourning for a cooling-off period.
A less extreme and more difficult problem was posed in Sankar v. The
State of Trinidad. 20 The defendant was charged with murder, his defence
Id. at 526.
14 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1975, c.21 (Sct.).
15 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c.46 (Sct.).
16 Set up by the Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c.35 (Eng.)(discussed further below).
'7 [1994] 3 W.L.R. 1124, 1128 (PC (Jam.)).
18 Id.
'9 Id. at 1126.
20 [1995] 1 W.L.R. 194 (PC (Trin.)); See also the general discussion of this case in the
context of the effect of an accused's failure to testify in All E.R. Rev 1995 pp 237-245.
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apparently being self-defence, provocation or accident.2' Obviously
establishing such a line of defence makes it almost inevitable that the defendant
will have to give evidence. Towards the end of the prosecution's case a
conversation took place between the defendant and his counsel in which
"something" was said which caused counsel, as a matter of professional duty, to
advise the appellant to remain silent. As a result, defence counsel told the
court that he would not be presenting a defence and that if thejury accepted the
prosecution's case they should find him guilty.23 The defendant was convicted
and sentenced to death. His main contention on appeal was that counsel's
decision not to call him had deprived him of a fair trial.2
The Privy Council again agreed and allowed the appeal.25 Where defence
counsel was told something by his client which embarrassed his further conduct
of the trial he should investigate the matter fully, explain the options and if
necessary seek an adjournment for that purpose. Counsel here had not fulfilled
his duty to explain how important it was in such a case for the defendant to give
evidence. In reality the defendant had been deprived of the opportunity to
decide whether or not he should give evidence or at least make a statement from
the dock.26 Had he decided to do so it was almost certain that the various
defences would have been left to the jury with the possibility that the jury
would have acquitted him.
21 There are obvious difficulties in such a comprehensive combination ofdefences. A rare
discussion of the problem in English Law is Richard Gooderson, Defences in Double Harness,
in RESHAPING THE CRiMINAL LAW 138 (Glazebrook ed. 1978). In addition, Sir Patrick Hastings
in his Autobiography notes:
If ever it had been my lot to take a lady for a stray week-end, and at
the conclusion of the entertainment I had decided to cut her into
small pieces and place her in an unwanted suitcase ... I should
unhesitatingly have placed my future in Norman's hands, [Lord
Norman Burkett was a well-known and distinguished advocate]
relying confidently upon his ability to satisfy a county jury (a) that I
was not here, (b) that I had not cut up the lady, (c) and that if I had
she thoroughly deserved it.
SIR PATRICK HASTINGS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SIR PATRICK HASTINGS 130 (William Heineman
LTD 1948).22Sankar, [1995] 1 W.L.R. at 196.
23 Id. at 197.
24 id.
25 Id. at 194.
26 A statement from the dock is an unsworn statement made by the defendant from the
dock, not subject to cross-examination. It was abolished in England in but survives in some
Commonwealth jurisdictions.
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In fact, allegations of lawyer incompetence in the course of the trial seem to
have been comparatively rare in England. Compared to the United States, with
its Sixth Amendment protection, English Law seems to contain relatively few
cases where the competence of counsel has received exhaustive consideration at
the appellate level. There is nothing to compare with the detailed analysis of
the problem by the U.S. Supreme Court in for example, Strickland v.
Washington27 and United States v. Cronic.28 Those cases, it might be thought,
effectively suggested that there was a strong presumption that the challenged
conduct by counsel might have been sound trial strategy and the defendant
needed to make a colourable showing of innocence. The English case of
Regina v. Ensor certainly pointed in that direction in so far as it suggests that it
is a plea where the defendant has a considerable burden to discharge to have
any prospects of success. 29 The basis for the claim in this case arose from the
fact that the defendant faced two charges of rape based upon different incidents
with different victims. 30 It seems that the defendant made known his wish that
the counts be severed and it seems likely that such an application might have
been granted. The Court of Appeal was also willing to assume, for the sake of
argument, that if the indictment had been severed the defendant's chances of
acquittal would have been improved. 31  Nevertheless, apparently after
considering the matter carefully, defence counsel declined to make such an
application.32 He had formed the view that the delay in complaint being made
in the first charge of rape might well dispose the jury to acquit on that count.33
Since the evidence on the second count was, if anything, weaker they might
well go on to acquit on both charges. Lord Lane, giving the judgment of the
court, cited with approval a statement of Justice Taylor that "it should clearly be
understood that if defending counsel in the course of his conduct of the case
makes a decision, or takes a course which later appears to have been mistaken
or unwise, that generally speaking has never been regarded as a proper ground
for appeal. 34
That statement was said to be subject to the qualification that the conviction
should be quashed if the court had any lurking doubt that the appellant had
27 466 U.S. 668, 674 (1984).
2 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984).
29 [1989] 1 W.L.R. 497 (CA (Crim. Div.)).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 500.
32 Id.
33 Id.34 Id. at 502 (citations omitted).
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suffered some injustice as a result of, "flagrantly incompetent" representation
by his advocate. 35 The problem with this test was that the standard was both
vague and intended to be highly restrictive.36
In Regina v. Clinton,37 it was again made clear that the circumstances when
a verdict will be overturned based wholly or substantially on the conduct of
defence counsel are likely to be extremely rare. An example given of such a
case might be where a decision not to call the defendant was taken in defiance
of, or without, proper instructions. The case did, however, represent a
development from Ensor in that, it was stated, the focus of the court's attention
should always be, in the last resort, was the verdict safe or unsatisfactory. 38
The latest case to consider the issue, Regina v. Nangle, 3 9 predictably shows
the influence of the Human Rights Act 1998 on criminal procedure.40 The
Court of Appeal was clearly of the view that the conduct of the case both by
solicitors and counsel was in certain respects deficient, but without amounting
to flagrant incompetence. The conviction was upheld but the importance of the
case is that it appears firmly to shift the inquiry from asking whether there has
been flagrant incompetence to a consideration of the effect of counsel's
behaviour on the overall fairness of the trial.4'
35 Id.
36 It was criticised in the standard criminal practitioner's work, JoHN F. ARCHMOLD,
CRMINAL PLEADING, EvIDENcE AND PRACTICE § 7-82 (P.J. Richardson et. al. eds., Sweet &
Maxwell 2000) (1822), on the grounds that "there is no magic in any particular label. The issue
for the Court of Appeal is whether or not the conviction is safe, not whether counsel was
competent, incompetent or flagrantly incompetent." The current law on incompetent counsel in
Archbold 2003 is set out in one page at 7-82, in a volume containing 2,718 pages.
31 [19931 1 W.L.R. 1181 (CA (Crim. Div.)).
38 By virtue of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 the test is now simply "safety." The "or
unsatisfactory" clause was deleted, although it seems there was no intention to alter the law by
this change. See J.C. Smith, The Criminal Appeal Act 1995: (1) Appeals Against Conviction
[1995] CRIM.L.R. 920 (1995).
'9 [2001] CRIM.L.R. 506 (2001).
40 The case was one of many decided after the Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), had
been passed but before it came into force. In an unusual, if not unique, occurrence in English
law the appellate courts in criminal cases often behaved as if the Act was in force. No doubt
this was in part designed to prevent the matter being relitigated after the Act came into force on
the ground that the court had not previously taken account of the European Convention on
Human Rights, as the 1998 Act requires.
41 Article 6 of the European Convention requires that a defendant be afforded a 'fair trial'
with effective legal assistance.
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This seems an advance on the earlier cases, but the statements by the court
are clearly dicta and it is curious how undeveloped English law appears to be in
this area compared to American law. It seems probable that the case law
currently being generated from Strasbourg will in future be the best place to
seek guidance on how English courts are likely to deal with this issue. A recent
case, which also seems to suggest that the "flagrant incompetence" test is too
demanding, is Daud v. Portugal.42 Here a defence lawyer had only three days
to prepare for a complex fraud trial which resulted in the defendant receiving a
nine-year prison sentence. 3 This was said to violate the applicant's right under
Article 6(3) of the European Convention.44
III. INCOMPETENCE OUTSIDE THE TRIAL
All of what has been said so far might, however, give a misleading and
partial picture of lawyer incompetence and its effect on the English criminal
justice system. In particular, a number of recent and controversial changes have
shifted back the point where legal advice becomes crucial. The investigative
stage at the police station is now a point where a suspect may have to make
crucial decisions which will have a major impact on the trial. The Court of
Appeal has recently observed that, "the police interview and the trial are to be
seen as part of a continuous process in which the suspect is engaged from the
beginning.''45 There is scant recent empirical evidence, but it may be at this
42 4 BHRC 522 (1998).
41 Id at para. 21.
"The court stated:
The court notes that the first officially assigned lawyer, before
reporting sick, had not taken any steps as counsel for Mr Daud, who
tried unsuccessfully to conduct his own defence. As to the second
lawyer, whose appointment the applicant learned of only three days
before the beginning of the trial at the Criminal Court, the court
considers that she did not have the time she needed to study the file,
visit he r client in prison if necessary and prepare his defence. The
time between notification of the replacement of the lawyer (23
January...) and the hearing (26 January...) was too short for a
serious, complex casein which there had been no judicial
investigation and which led to a heavy sentence.
Id. at para 39.
45 In Regina v. Howell [2003] EWCA Crim 1, para 23 (CA (Crim. Div.)). This was
described in the case as a "benign continuum". Id. at para. 24. See the discussion in, The
Revised PACE Codes of Practice: A Further Step Towards Inquisitorialism, [2003] CRIM. L.R.
355.
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point that the indigent defendant is likely to be most prejudiced by
incompetence, often perhaps in a way that will not come immediately to light,
if at all.
The most important factor in this process is arguably the Conservative
government's enactment of section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order
Act 1994.46 This was passed as part of a number of measures designed to
restrict the common law right to silence and enables adverse inferences to be
drawn from an accused's failure to mention when questioned any fact later
relied upon in his defence. 47 There are also provisions in sections 35-37 which
similarly permit the drawing of adverse inferences from a defendant's failure to
give evidence at trial, his failure to account for objects, substances or marks, or
his failure to account for his presence at a particular place.48
Section 34 was a controversial measure then and now. Two Royal
Commissions had rejected the government's proposals and there was
opposition to them by the Bar Council, the Law Society and the Criminal Bar
Association. 49 The then government nevertheless pressed ahead with the
reforms which, as has happened in the past with criminal measures, had been
previously enacted in Northern Ireland. 50 The obvious dilemma the provision
poses for a suspect and their legal adviser is that a tightrope has to be walked
46 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c.33 (Eng.).
47 Section 34 states:
(1) Where in any proceedings against a person for an office, evidence is given
that the accused --
(a) at any time before he was charged with the offence, on being questioned
under caution by a constable trying to discover whether or by whom the
offence had been committed, failed to mention any fact relied on in those
proceedings; or
(b) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might be
prosecuted for it, failed to mention any such fact, being a fact which in the
circumstances existing at the time the accused could reasonably have been
expected to mention when so questioned, charged or informed ...
(2)(d) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the
offence charged, may draw such inferences from the failure as appear proper.
Id. at § 34.481 Id. at § 35-37.
49 In an entirely different context, it seems reminiscent of the support given to rules 413-
415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence at about the same time. See FED. R. EvID. 413-415.
50 Where the climate, both political and legal, is somewhat different from the mainland. A
significant legal difference is the existence of so-called Diplock Courts where terrorist offences
can be tried without ajury. There is no right otherwise in English law to request a bench trial,
rather than trial by jury, for serious offences.
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between saying nothing, which might be the subject of adverse inferences, and
saying too much, which may be incriminating or turn out to be embarrassing
later. A very recent example of the difficulties posed for the courts in trying to
resolve the difficulties posed by this provision is Regina v. Howell." The
suspect gave a "no comment" interview, apparently on the advice of his
solicitor who was concerned that there was no written statement from the
injured party.52 The trial judge nevertheless gave a direction under section 34
of the 1994 Act that adverse inferences could be drawn.53 The Court of Appeal
affirmed the conviction. As they put it, "there must always be soundly based
objective reasons for silence, sufficiently cogent and telling to weigh in the
balance against the clear public interest in an account being given by the
suspect to the police."54 A defence solicitor's predictably cautious advice in
waiting until a clearer picture had emerged of the alleged events was, at least on
this occasion, not enough to protect his client from the clutches of section 34.
An accused may have access to legal advice but can still be harmed if he fails
correctly to second-guess the advice of his or her lawyer. At least where the
suspect is genuinely relying on that advice, and not merely taking advantage of
a self-serving excuse, difficult though it may sometimes be to draw that line,
the present law is surely capable of putting an interviewee in an
intolerable position.
Not surprisingly, in the brief time that it has been in force the section has
generated a large amount of other highly technical case law, the general effect
of which is to interpret narrowly, in favour of the defendant, provisions towards
"' [2003] EWCA Crim 1 (CA (Crim Div)). A helpful summary and criticism of the case
can also be found in Tom Rees & D.J. Birch, Evidence: Criminal Justice andPublic OrderAct
1994 S.34 - Silence of Defendant at Interview, [2003] CRIM. L.R. 405, 405-408 (2003).
52 Howell, [2003] EWCA Crim I at para. 5. The difficulties of giving effective and
appropriate advice when there is no signed statement from the complainant are set out in R.
Brown, The Benign Continuum?, ARCBOLDNEWS, Feb. 3 2003, at 7-8. The author, inter alia,
makes the point that, "Experience has shown that a witness's first, formal, signed statement may
be quite different in content from the allegation first made orally or in draft to the police.
Solicitors are likely to encounter genuine difficulties if they are required to give constructive
advice about s. 34 to clients in the absence of any evidence and having to rely on inadequate
information of the allegation."
" Id. at para. 9.
54 Id. at par. 24. The effect of the present law is summarized in A. Keogh, The right to
silence - revisited again, NEW LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 153, at 1352-1353 (2003). The decision has
been criticized as "mischievous," A. Choo & A. Jennings, Silence on legal advice revisited: R
v. Howell, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF, Vol. 7, No.3, at 185-190, (2003),
but its correctness appears to have been recently affirmed by the dicta of Laws L.J. in R v Knight
[2003] Crim. L. R. 799.
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which a significant number of thejudiciary seem deeply unsympathetic. 55 The
sophistication of this case law now means that an evaluation of a lawyer's
performance can become the subject of expert testimony, particularly since trial
judges may have limited knowledge and experience of interrogation at a police
station.56 It has led to a body of cases which, for example, has excluded
prosecution evidence on the grounds that it was obtained following incompetent
legal advice. Examples of incompetence from the cases include failure to
obtain adequate discovery from the police, failure to keep proper records and
errors as to the law. Indeed, given that arguments from principle seem to have
cut little ice in the debate over this provision, the most cogent reason for
repealing section 34 may be that it is simply no longer cost-effective. 7
Ironically, a measure passed to increase conviction rates of the supposedly
guilty has now become such a legal minefield, capable of generating hyper
technical appeals, that it may now be having little or no effect in furthering the
policy of the 1994 Act.
The evidence of whether suspects are receiving the often sophisticated legal
advice now required is currently very incomplete. In the 1990's the Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice found the standard of police station advice
"disturbing".5 8 Since then various initiatives have been taken by the Law
Society and by the revision of the Codes of Practice for interrogation under the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.59 It therefore seems probable that
standards have been rising in this area but the flurry of research activity
promoted by the last Royal Commission has not been maintained. Certainly a
number of troubling cases have reached the courts in recent times 60 which gives
cause for concern. The lack of cases, moreover, as often, may conceal a larger
problem. In many comparatively minor cases the advice will not even be given
by a solicitor, but by a legal executive, and it may be that this exemplifies the
way in which a high profile figure able to command large legal resources is at a
significant advantage in the English system over the indigent defendant. There
55 A strong argument for the current comparative ineffectiveness of Section 34 is to be
found in Ian Dennis, Silence in the Police Station: the Marginalisation of Section 34, [2002]
CiRw.L.R. 25 (2002).
56 See Ed Cape, Incompetent Police Advice and the Exclusion of Evidence, [2002] CRIM.
L.R. 471, 483 (2002).
57 The argument is compellingly presented in Diane J. Birch, Suffering in Silence: A Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, [1999]
CiM.L.R. 769 (1999).
58 See, Cape, supra note 56, at 471 n. 2-4.
59 See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60 (Eng.)
60 See Cape, supra note 56.
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is a case for some further empirical research to measure the effect, if any, of
developments in the law and procedure over the last five years.
IV. APPEALS AND REVIEWS
The standard and scope of appellate review is another area where there is
continuing change and development, deeply influenced both by the Human
Rights Act 1998 and the establishment of the Criminal Cases Review
Commission. In 1995 the criterion for review of a conviction was changed
from 'unsafe and unsatisfactory' to merely "unsafe."' Although not intended
to alter existing practice it was probably an ill-advised reform in that the
concept of safety, without further definition or elucidation, was almost bound to
cause difficulties. Soon afterwards the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998
was felt and again has influenced the policy of the court. What the recent cases
do illustrate is a tension, which may not have been finally resolved, between
what one might call the crime control and due process models of criminal
procedure.
In Regina v. Chalkley6 2 the defendants had been charged with conspiracy
to rob. The defence made an application to exclude the evidence of tape
recordings which the police had obtained by placing a listening device in the
home of one of the defendants, but the judge rejected this application.63 The
defendants thereupon formed the view that any defence had been rendered
hopeless and changed their pleas to guilty.64 One of the issues raised was
whether a defendant could appeal at all under these circumstances.65 The court
held that this was not a plea "founded upon" a ruling of the judge.66 Even an
erroneous ruling of law as to the admissibility of evidence did not necessarily
mean that the conviction was not "safe."67 The court also noted that the
absence from the new test of the words "or unsatisfactory," and "material
irregularity" meant that: "The court has no power under the substituted section
2(1) to allow an appeal if it does not think the conviction is unsafe but is
dissatisfied in some other way with what went on at the trial.'6 8 The court
61 See Smith, supra note 38.
62 [1998] 3 W.L.R. 146 (CA (Crim. Div.)).





68 Id. at 163.
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clearly appreciated that this was a significant change in the way the court had
previously interpreted its powers.69 The result seemed to be that if a defendant
pleaded guilty because of an incorrect ruling of law, which meant that an
essential element of the offence was not proved, an appeal was possible. It
might be otherwise if a plea amounts to an admission of the material facts but
the plea has been made as a consequence of a wrong ruling as to admissibility
of evidence. An appellate court, on this approach, might still have considered
the conviction 'safe.' As was noted at the time, "It is illogical that trial courts
should be required to exclude evidence, the admission of which would have no
effect on the validity of any conviction which might result."7°
The obvious problem with this approach is that it was, even at the time,
difficult to reconcile with Article 6 of the European Convention which
guarantees the right to a "fair" trial.7' If evidence is wrongly admitted, how can
a resulting conviction really be termed "fair"? The court's view that
"...procedural unfairness not resulting in unsafety of a conviction may be
marked in some manner other than by quashing the conviction ', 72 was ominous.
The subsequent case law has arguably shown a gradual retreat from this
position. The problem of the relationship between the accuracy of a conviction
and the fairness of the trial is strikingly illustrated by Regina v. Smith. 73 At the
end of the prosecution's case thejudge wrongly rejected a defence submission
of no case to answer.74 Perhaps rather unusually, the defendants nevertheless
went on to be convicted. The issue, therefore, arose of whether the court
should quash the conviction, or consider the evidence received after the
wrongful rejection of a submission of no case. Although it is not completely
clear if this is what happened in the case, the court poses the extreme instance
of a submission being wrongly rejected but the defendant then being cross-
examined into admitting his guilt.75 What should the Court of Appeal then do?
The answer given was that the appellate court should judge the position at the
69 It may be noteworthy that, at the date of the trial, the terms of the then Human Rights
Bill had been widely publicised and discussed. The subsequent case of Regina v. Kennedy also
reflects this approach. See [1998] CRIM.L.R. 739 (CA (Crim. Div.)).
70 Id. at 741.
71 Although at the date of the case the Convention was still technically an international
treaty, not part of any domestically binding statute.
72 [1998] 2 All E.R. 155, 173b (CA (Crim. Div.)).
73 [2000] 1 All E.R. 263 (CA (Crim. Div.)).74 Id. at 265.
71 Id. at 266.
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time when the submission was made.76 Accordingly, the conviction is to be
regarded as "unsafe" since the defendant was entitled in law to be acquitted at
the halfway stage. To allow the trial to continue was said to be an abuse of
process and fundamentally unfair.
What is also striking about the decision, apart from its confident brevity, is
that it arguably departs from earlier authority" and betrays an approach much
more in sympathy with respect for due process. Other cases confirmed this
movement 78 but it still seems that not all convictions obtained where there has
been some irregularity which would amount to unfairness under Article 6 of the
European Convention are necessarily "unsafe" within the meaning of the
Criminal Appeal Act 1968. The problem for the courts will be to decide what
are the criteria for deciding when "unfairness" fatally compromises "safety."
At least in Smith it is quite clear that, had the material irregularity not occurred,
the jury could not possibly have returned a guilty verdict. The issue would
simply never have been left to them.
The most recent significant contribution to this area, Regina v. Togher,
takes a further step away from the approach taken in Chalkley, where the
"safety" of the conviction seemed to have been considered irrespective of the
trial process which procured it.79 As Lord Woolf puts it, "Applying the broader
approach... we consider that if a defendant has been denied a fair trail it will
almost be inevitable that the conviction will be regarded as unsafe." 80 The
problem remains of what sort of "unfairness" will be regarded as fatal to the
safety of a conviction? It seems probable that, under the influence of the
Human Rights Act 1998, some convictions which would previously have been
upheld may now be quashed as "unfair." 81 In the somewhat later case of
Regina v. Doubtfire, Lord Woolf adds that where a conviction resulted from a
trial that was unfair under Article 6 of the European Convention, it would,
"almost be inevitable" that it would qualify as "unsafe" under the Criminal
Appeal Act 1968 the Court of Appeal appears to have applied Lord Woolf s
dictum. 2
761id.
77 Which might well have justified upholding the conviction in these circumstances. See
Victor Tunkel, When safe convictions are unsafely quashed, 149 NEW L.J. 1089 (1999).
78 See Regina v. Davis [2000] CRIM.L.R. 1012 (CA (Crim. Div.)).
79 [2001] 3 All E.R. 463 (CA (Crim. Div.)).
80 Id. at 473.
81 This seems to be the view of Professor Smith in his commentary on R. v. Doubtfire,
[20011 CRIM.L.R. 813, 815.
8 Id at 813.
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Clearly there is certain to be further case law in this area and there is
considerable scope for elucidation of what, in concrete terms, constitutes
unfairness in the course of a criminal trial. In some ways the law has arguably
returned to a position close to that which existed before section 2(1) of the 1968
Act was allegedly simplified. It is doubtful, however, if this adequately
accounts for what is happening. In large measure it is arguably the pervasive
effect of incorporation of the European Convention which is a vital determinant
of how English courts now approach problems in the criminal process.
V. REVIEW AFTER APPEAL
One of the most significant developments in the criminal process has been
the decision to set up a Criminal Cases Review Commission following the
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice of 1993. Prior
to this the Home Secretary did have a power to refer cases back to the Court of
Appeal,8 3 and indeed it was under this power that the convictions of the so-
called Birmingham Six were reviewed. There was, however, a perception that
various Home Secretaries were too reluctant to use this power and also perhaps
that the whole procedure was insufficiently independent since the decision was
made within the government bureaucracy of the Home Office. Accordingly the
new Commission was set up. It has not less than eleven members, independent
of government although appointed by the Crown. One third must be lawyers
but part of the policy behind the new arrangements is that some are lay
members, 4 albeit they are likely to have experience of the criminal justice
system. Part of the reason for basing it in Birmingham is to mark its separation
from and independence of central government.
Under section 9 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 The Commission has a
broad power to refer any conviction to the Court of Appeal if they consider,
"there is a real possibility that the conviction, verdict, finding or sentence
would not be upheld.' ' 5 It is not the intention in this article to consider and
evaluate the detailed operation of this review mechanism, although it is
generally regarded as having been a success. 6 It is tempting to think that an
83 Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, s.17 (Eng.).
Criminal Appeal Act 1995 s.8 (Eng.).
s Idat s. 9.
86 A study which helps to provide the background to the need for such a body is, CLIVE
WALKER & KEIR STARMER EDs., MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF JUSTICE IN ERROR
(1999). It is now, however, slightly out of date. An analysis of the Commission's performance
in its early years can be found in A. James et al., The Criminal Cases Review Commission,
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independent commission is likely to be much more willing to examine a claim
of wrongful conviction than the executive orjudiciary, both of whom may have
a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. This might particularly be the
case if lawyer incompetence is a strand in the case and/or that the conviction is
not recent and for a serious offence.
Just one recent aspect of their work has raised new issues which may be
worth noting because they involve consideration of controversial areas which
loom large in the American literature, namely the death penalty and DNA
evidence. A whole generation has grown up in the UK in belief that the
execution of James Hanratty in 1962 for murder represented one of the last
notorious miscarriages of justice before the abolition of the death penalty in
1965. Indeed, the aftermath of the case may well have accelerated that result.
Part of the reason for the subsequent doubt was that it involved a violent
murder and sexual assault by someone known previously only as a petty
criminal. The crucial identification evidence was provided by the surviving
female victim who had been shot.87 The case was referred to the Court of
Appeal by the Commission 88 some forty years after the event. In a detailed
judgment the court demolished all 17 grounds of appeal and finally dismissed
the appeal.89 In particular they declared: "The DNA evidence made what was a
strong case even stronger."90 This was therefore a case where the new
technique of DNA evidence served to confirm the correctness of a conviction.
One of the legal issues nevertheless raised is what standard to apply to appellate
review in such a case. Undoubtedly the overall trend has been to increase the
procedural safeguards for the defendant so that convictions which might not
even have been challenged in the past might today be reversed. This is not an
entirely novel difficulty as the court had to deal with this issue in Regina v.
Bentley where the trial had taken place in 1952.91 In Regina v. Hanratty the
court asserts that current standards of fairness should be applied regardless of
when the trial took place but that non-compliance with rules which were not
current at the time may need to be treated differently from the breach of rules
which were in force at the date of the trial.92 It also said that the question of
whether a trial is so seriously flawed as to render the conviction unsafe because
[2000] Crim. L.R. 140. The Commission has a website which publishes their annual reports.
See www.ccrc.gov.uk (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
87 See Regina v. Hanratty, [2002] 3 All E.R. 534 (CA (Crim. Div.)).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 534-535.
90ld. at 550.
91 [1999] CRI.L.R.330 (CA (Crim. Div.)).
92 [2002] 3 All E.R. at 543
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it fails today's minimum standards must be approached "in the round," taking
account of all relevant circumstances.93
Quite what this standard means in its practical application to older cases is
not entirely easy to divine. However, before totally discounting this supposed
standard it is worth looking at how the court viewed this case. By
contemporary standards there were procedural imperfections, in particular some
material which would now have been made available to the defence was not. It
seems probable that, had the conviction followed a trial held today, the appeal
would have been allowed. Nevertheless in Hanratty the court was clearly of
the view that any procedural shortcomings of that time fell far short of what
would be required to render the conviction unsafe.94
What is encouraging about this reference is that the independent
Commission was willing to have a capital case reconsidered in a waythat might
well have been politically difficult to secure when, as in the past, the decision
lay essentiallywith a branch of central government. But it also raises issues on
how old cases are to be viewed that had not been previously fully addressed. It
does at least, however, provide a way in which arguments about a capital case
can be finally resolved, or at least as finally as the law can resolve anything. It
may also show, as this case surely does, that not all claims relating to notorious
miscarriages ofjustice turn out as people had expected. For obvious reasons,
particularly the existence of the death penalty, it is understandable that debate
in the United States is often cast in terms of wrongful conviction. In the United
Kingdom the lack of such a penalty has perhaps helped encourage the approach
in the literature to embrace not just issues of wrongful conviction but also a
more general concern for inaccurate verdicts. The conviction of the guilty is
also an important element in any rational scheme of criminal procedure.
93 id.
94 See id.

